

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MARK CRUMPACKER,)
)
 Plaintiff,) Case No. 1:16-cv-01053
)
 v.)
)
 CAROLINE CIRAOLO-KLEPPER;)
 MICHAEL MARTINEAU;)
 MARK J. LANGER;)
 COMM'R., INTERNAL REVENUE;)
 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL;)
 and)
 2 UNKNOWN-NAMED IRS/DOJ)
 ATTORNEYS,)
)
 Defendants.)
)
 _____)
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
)
 Counterclaim Plaintiff,)
)
 v.)
)
 MARK CRUMPACKER,)
 MICHAEL B. ELLIS, and)
 ROBERT A. MCNEIL)
)
 Counterclaim Defendants.)
 _____)

**UNITED STATES' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
SECOND MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY COUNTERCLAIM
DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT**

The United States of America moves the Court for an order directing counterclaim defendants Michael B. Ellis and Robert A. McNeil to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for violating the Court's April 19, 2017 Order of Permanent Injunction. (Dkt. No. 44).

As this Court is well aware, Mr. Ellis and Mr. McNeil are tax non-filers engaged in a many-year litigation campaign to prove that: (1) the Internal Revenue Service's process for assessing federal income taxes against nonfilers like them is really an elaborate criminal artifice involving falsification of computer records; and (2) the Department of Justice is complicit in that scheme by using falsified records in court against those nonfilers. Every court confronted with their complaints has dismissed them under the Tax Anti-Injunction Act for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. They also persist in filing new lawsuits alleging that executive branch officials and even judicial officers are engaged in a conspiracy to deny them their constitutional rights. Against that background, this Court entered a nationwide injunction against them imposing the modest requirement that, before filing any additional constitutional challenges, they first apply to the District Court for leave to file the new action.

McNeil and Ellis have now twice ignored and violated the Court's order. On August 28, 2017, along with eleven other plaintiffs, they filed a new lawsuit in this district against this Court and two other judicial officers for dismissing their prior legal challenges for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On November 29, 2017, after the United States moved for an order to show cause why McNeil and Ellis should not be held in contempt for filing the first action, they filed yet another, which is the subject of this motion: *McNeil v. Brown*, No 1:17-cv-02602 (D.D.C.). This time, they are suing judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, alleging that they violated McNeil and Ellis' First and Fifth Amendment rights affirming the district court's dismissals (including this Court's dismissal).

McNeil and Ellis have made two things clear. First, they have no hesitation using the courts for the wholly improper purpose of harassing executive branch officials and judicial officers, no matter how many times their actions are dismissed. And second, they have no

hesitation simply ignoring this Court’s order and pressing forward with their campaign. By filing this new action without seeking permission from the Court to do so, they have doubled down on their bet that they can ignore this Court’s orders with impunity. McNeil and Ellis’s unrepentant contumacy demands the entry of an order of contempt.

Background

Counterclaim Defendants Michael B. Ellis and Robert A. McNeil are serial filers of lawsuits challenging actions taken by the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Justice to assess and collect taxes against them. See Order of Injunction (“Order”) [Dkt. No. 44] at ¶¶ 1-4.¹ All of their individual lawsuits – as well as the lawsuits they assisted others in filing – raise the same claims and have been dismissed for the same reasons. *Id.* ¶ 5.

On February 28, 2017, the United States moved for entry of a permanent injunction against counterclaim defendants Ellis and McNeil barring them nationwide from bringing certain lawsuits without first seeking leave of court. (Dkt. No. 30). The Court entered the Order of Permanent Injunction (“Order”) on April 19, 2017. The injunction bars McNeil and Ellis from

Filing, or assisting in the filing of, any civil action in any United States District Court . . . asserting, or purporting to assert a claim

¹ McNeil and Ellis have taken credit for the IRS’s “suspension” of the Substitute for Return Program, suggesting that their litigation campaign unearthed illegality that brought about that suspension. This is not at all true. The IRS scaled back the SFR program due to limited resources; it did not suspend it. As noted in the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (“TIGTA”) report referenced in their pleadings, the SFR program remains an important tool for bringing “noncompliant taxpayers” (*e.g.*, McNeil and Ellis) “into compliance to ensure fairness and reduce the burden on the vast majority of taxpayers who fully pay their taxes on time. An effective Automated Substitute for Return Program is an important part of its efforts to bring those who do not file tax returns into compliance.” A SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED AUTOMATED SUBSTITUTE FOR RETURN PROGRAM NEGATIVELY AFFECTED COLLECTION AND FILING COMPLIANCE, TIGTA (September 29, 2017) *available at* <https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2017reports/201730078fr.pdf>.

under the United States Constitution or the Administrative Procedure Act challenging actions taken by the Internal Revenue Service in preparing to assess and assessing income tax liabilities pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6020 . . . [and/or] challenging actions taken by the Department of Justice to defend against [such] suits and/or suits to collect income tax liabilities.

Order at p. 5.

In order to bring such a suit, McNeil and Ellis were required to

File with the court a document titled “Application Pursuant to Court Order Seeking Leave to File,” that: (i) certifies that the claims presented are new claims never before raised and disposed of on the merits on or jurisdictional grounds by any court; (ii) describes the allegations of the complaint; and (iii) contains a certification under penalty of contempt that the allegations of the complaint are true; and (iv) attaches a copy of this injunction.

Order at p. 6. The injunction provides that McNeil and Ellis “shall not be permitted to file said action unless and until such application is granted.” *Id.* McNeil and Ellis unsuccessfully moved pursuant to Rule 59 for relief from the order of injunction, and have appealed the denial of their Rule 59 motion, which is pending.

On August 24, 2017, McNeil and Ellis² filed another complaint in this district: *McNeil, et al. v. Harvey, et al.*, No. 17-1720 (D.D.C.). This new lawsuit names as defendants three judicial

² Joining McNeil and Ellis are eleven other plaintiffs, including the plaintiff in this underlying action (Mark Crumpacker); two individuals whose matters were consolidated with this case (William McGarvin, Gary Dwaileebe); two other plaintiffs who filed duplicative actions (Louis DePolo and Melba Ford); and the plaintiff in another action currently pending in this district (Harold Stanley). Crumpacker, McGarvin and Dwaileebe’s actions were all dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by this Court on December 31, 2016. (Dkt. No. 25). The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit granted the United States’ motion for summary affirmance in the consolidated cases on September 13, 2017. DePolo and Ford’s actions were also dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. *DePolo v. Ciraolo-Klepper*, 197 F. Supp. 3d 186, 192 (D.D.C. 2016); *Ford v. Ciraolo-Klepper*, No. 17-cv-00034, 2017 WL 2189577, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 18, 2017). Stanley’s action is currently pending. *Stanley, et al. v. Lynch*, No. 1:17-cv-00022 (D.D.C.).

officers (including this Court) that dismissed the plaintiffs' prior legal challenges. The lawsuit challenges these dismissals and seeks a declaratory judgment that:

- (i) Each plaintiff "complain[ed] as their core fact content that IRS never prepares substitute income tax returns" as to each of them;
- (ii) Each court did not "adjudicate [their] core fact controvers[ies],"
- (iii) Each court "falsif[ied] the record by attributing litigants relief they did NOT seek, then dismiss[ed] the cases on the basis of that fabrication,"
- (iv) Each court's "uniform falsification . . . provides strong circumstantial evidence victims' cases, as filed, are meritorious,"
- (v) Each court's "uniform falsification . . . violated each Plaintiffs' [sic] rights to adequate, effective and meaningful access to courts and due process of law, and constitute, as well, obstruction of the administration of justice,"
- (vi) Each court's "uniform falsification" renders their dismissal of no "precedential value or preclusive effect."

Exhibit A (*McNeil, et al. v. Harvey, et al.*, Complaint) at ¶¶ 49(a)-(f). The Complaint omits any mention of the fact that this Court has entered an injunction against McNeil and Ellis.

On November 29, 2017, McNeil and Ellis filed *McNeil, et al. v. Brown, et al.* against the United States Court of Appeals panels that affirmed the dismissals of their cases. Again, they seek a declaratory judgment that:

- Appellate relief was "denied" in the eight appeals at issue because the order of summary affirmance did not "clearly identify[] the standard of review used. . . provid[e] any explanation of how the Anti-Injunction Act supposedly applied to the **actual** allegations and relief the litigants sought below, [or] explain[] how the equitable

exception to the AIA supposedly did *not* apply to those allegations and relief sought.”

Complaint at ¶ 17(A);

- The orders of summary affirmance were authored by a “single source who is NOT a United States Circuit Judge.” *Id.* ¶ 17(B);
- The orders used the “clearly erroneous” standard. *Id.* ¶ 17(C);
- The “author” of the orders “applied the Anti-Injunction Act to the allegations and relief fabricated by attorneys in the district court, then attributed to Plaintiffs, in utter derogation of the appellants’ complaint on appeal of those fabrications[.]” *Id.* ¶ 17(D)
- The “author” of the orders did not resolve “*de novo* the contested dispositive legal controversy whether 28 U.S.C. §6020(b) grants power to create substitute returns in income tax matters, despite the Commissioner’s repeated public concessions 6020(b) does NOT[.]” *Id.* ¶ 17(E);
- The denial of the eight appeals “violate[d] the litigants’ rights to adequate, effective, and meaningful access to courts” and proved that appellate relief “does not exist in cases alleging that IRS attorneys have approved the use of systematically falsified government records, and that government attorneys falsify the record of litigation to prevent successful appeals.” *Id.* ¶ 17(F)
- Americans’ “rights to meaningful appellate relief from the underlying alleged IRS record falsification program [are] *constantly being violated* by [United States Court of Appeals Judges Janice R. Brown, Douglas H. Ginsburg, and Robert L. Wilkins]’s collusion to prevent their victims from exercising their rights to secure meaningful appellate remedy.” *Id.* ¶ 17(G).

Argument

I. MCNEIL AND ELLIS HAVE VIOLATED THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION

Plaintiffs McNeil and Ellis have filed their second post-injunction lawsuit challenging the outcome of their prior dismissed cases. By filing this new case – which revisits the merits of the previously-dismissed actions, and challenges the summary affirmances of those cases by the D.C. Circuit – McNeil and Ellis have plainly violated the injunction against them in this case. They should accordingly be required to show cause why they should not be held in contempt.

A party should be held in contempt for violating an injunction where the moving party has demonstrated “by clear and convincing evidence that (1) there was a clear and unambiguous court order in place; (2) that order required certain conduct by the Defendants; and (3) Defendants failed to comply with that order.” *United States v. Latney’s Funeral Home, Inc.*, 41 F. Supp. 3d 24, 29-30 (D.D.C. 2014). Once the moving party has made that showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to justify the noncompliance by, for example, demonstrating . . . its good faith attempts to comply.” *Id.* at 30. Contempt sanctions are “coercive and avoidable through obedience, and thus may be imposed in an ordinary civil proceeding upon notice and an opportunity to be heard.” *Ashford v. East Coast Exp. Eviction*, 774 F. Supp. 2d 329, 331 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting *Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell*, 512 U.S. 821, 827 (1994)).

All of these elements are satisfied here. The injunction clearly and unambiguously prohibits the defendants from “filing . . . any civil action in any United States District Court asserting, or purporting to assert a claim under the United States Constitution or the Administrative Procedure Act challenging actions taken by the Internal Revenue Service in preparing to assess and assessing income tax liabilities pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6020,” or actions taken by the Department of Justice to “defend against” such suits, without first obtaining leave of court. Order at p.5, ¶ 1(a). The injunction requires McNeil and Ellis follow certain steps in

order to obtain leave. Specifically, the injunction requires them to file an “Application Pursuant to Court Order Seeking Leave to File, that (i) certifies that the claims presented are new claims never before raised and disposed of on the merits or on jurisdictional grounds by any court; (ii) describes the allegations of the complaint; and (iii) contains a certification under penalty of contempt that the allegations of the complaint are true; and (iv) attaches a copy of this injunction.” *Id.* at p.5, ¶ 2.

Ellis and McNeil have violated the pre-filing leave requirements of the injunction. First, this new action on its face expressly challenges the holdings of the cases that this Court held were brought without any “good faith or legal basis” and “for the purpose of harassment.” Order at p.3, ¶¶ 11-12. Whereas their first post-injunction suit targeted the district court judges whom McNeil and Ellis felt wronged them, this suit is aimed at the D.C. Circuit judges who granted summary affirmances. Thus there can be no doubt that, even though this action is brought against judicial officers rather than the United States, it is no less a challenge to “actions taken by the Internal Revenue Service in preparing to assess and assessing income tax liabilities pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6020.”³

Second, this new action purports to assert “claim[s] under the United States Constitution;” namely the First and Fifth Amendments. Those claims merely recycle allegations that McNeil and Ellis have made in countless pleadings and motions in this case and others.

³ McNeil and Ellis’s assertion that they “do not seek determination of whether the underlying IRS record falsification exists” does not bring this new action beyond the reach of the injunction. They expressly seek a judgment that judicial officers denied their appeals based upon “systematically falsified government records” (Exhibit A. ¶ 17(F)) and that they were “involve[d]” in that scheme (*id.* ¶ 33) and thereby denied them review of their appeals. That requires reconsideration of their underlying suits. This suit is therefore no different than any of their other lawsuits, or appeals of the dismissals thereof.

Compare, e.g., Exhibit A at ¶¶ 45-46 (alleging First Amendment Right of Access to Courts denied by “scheme to systematically fabricate and attribute to *pro per* litigants relief they never sought, thereby avoiding adjudication of the cases on their ACTUAL merits) *with* Exhibit A to First Motion for Order to Show Cause [Dkt. No. 53] (same), *and* Complaint [Dkt. No. 1] at ¶ 33 (accusing defendants of violating First Amendment by “fabricat[ing] allegations, falsely attributed [to] them.”), *and* Motion to Alter or Vacate Judgment [Dkt. No. 46] at p. 8, (accusing courts of “attributing to victims allegations they never made and relief they never sought”), 15 (McNeil and Ellis seek to “compel judges to adjudicate the ACTUAL merits” of their cases). The First Amendment claim in particular has also been raised in a separate action against this Court and other judges on this court in *Ellis v. Jackson, et al*, No. 1:16-cv-2313 (D.D.C.), and *McNeil v. Harvey*, No. 1:17-cv-01720 (D.D.C.).⁴

Third, there is no evidence that McNeil or Ellis filed the required “Application Pursuant to Court Order Seeking Leave to File” before filing this new complaint, nor any evidence that any court granted them leave to file it. They have therefore violated paragraph 2 of the injunction.

II. THE COURT SHOULD IMPOSE MONETARY CONTEMPT SANCTIONS AGAINST MCNEIL AND ELLIS

Upon a finding of civil contempt, the court may impose coercive and compensatory sanctions. *United States v. United Mine Workers of America*, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947); *Evans v. Williams*, 206 F.3d 1292, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The Court should impose both here – namely: (i) a per diem fine of \$100 for every day that Ellis and McNeil do not withdraw their

⁴ See Dkt. No. 1 [Complaint] at ¶¶90-98.

complaint and obey the required “leave” procedure of the court’s injunction; and (ii) an order requiring Ellis and McNeil to pay to the United States its reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in bringing this motion.

Coercive sanctions should be crafted to bring a contemnor into compliance with a court order and to ensure his future compliance. *See Bagwell*, 512 U.S. at 826. Compensatory sanctions, on the other hand, ensure that the moving party receives the benefit of the order that has been violated. *Landmark Legal Found. v. EPA*, 272 F. Supp. 2d 70, 76 (D.D.C. 2003). In fashioning contempt sanctions, courts have broad discretion and should consider “the character and magnitude of the harm threatened by continued contumacy, and the probable effectiveness of any suggested sanction in bringing about the result desired.” *United Mine Workers of America*, 330 U.S. at 304.

A. McNeil and Ellis Should be Fined \$1000 for Every Day that they Fail to Withdraw their Complaint

Courts have recognized that a per diem fine for each day a contemnor fails to comply with an affirmative court order is a valid and permissible coercive sanction. *See Bagwell*, 512 U.S. at 829; *United States v. Ayres*, 166 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 1999).

A per diem fine is an appropriate sanction in this case. Simply, McNeil and Ellis’s decision to file this new action without first seeking leave of court puts them squarely in violation of paragraph 2 of the injunction in this case. Every day that the new lawsuit is pending on the court’s docket without an order permitting its filing restarts that violation. Accordingly, the only way that McNeil and Ellis can “purge” their contempt is to dismiss their complaint and – if they truly want to pursue this action – follow the proper procedures by filing the required application containing the appropriate certifications and attachments.

A fine of \$1000 per day is coercive without being punitive. According to the November 8, 27, 2017 entry on McNeil's website, he has received \$6,882.61 of donations to fund this vexatious litigation campaign "for the period of January 1 thru November 8, 2017," which has fully funded that campaign for the year, including this new case, with \$45.75 in surplus. Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Motion for Order to Show Cause, Exhibit B. Accordingly, McNeil and Ellis should be fined this amount to ensure that they are personally financially coerced to comply with the injunction, and do not simply pass on the cost of compliance to third parties who donate money to their prohibited conduct.

B. The Court Should Award Attorney's Fees to the United States

In order to compensate the Government's loss from the defendant's disobedience of the injunction, the United States further requests that the court award attorney's fees incurred in preparing and litigating this contempt proceeding. *See United Mine Workers*, 330 U.S. at 303-304. As both McNeil and Ellis are in contempt of the Order, they should be jointly liable for the United States' attorney's fees. The United States requests that it be given fourteen (14) days after the entry of an Order of Contempt to submit a declaration in support of the fee amount.

Conclusion

McNeil and Ellis's new action is nothing more than a continuation of their campaign of litigation brought solely "for the purpose of harassment, and not for any legitimate purpose." For the foregoing reasons, the Court should issue an order to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. A proposed order to show cause is submitted herewith.

Dated: December 22, 2017

Respectfully submitted,

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