I’m continuing with my Lindsey Springer updates:


—- Original Message —–
From: Lindsey Springer
To: lindsey springer
Sent: Monday, February 01, 2010 12:04 PM
Subject: Supreme Court grants Springer permission to appeal published Tenth Circuit Court decision in 08-9004 regarding Paperwork Reduction Act Penalty Protection Claims

Lindsey Springer here and updating on my appeal to the Supreme Court from the published decision of the Tenth Circuit dated August 31, 2009 wherein the Tenth Circuit found that the penalty for failure to pay under Title 26, United States Code, Section 6651(a)(3) is not a penalty and where they found “interest” under Title 26, United States Code, Section 6601 is not a penalty.

I received permission to appeal on Thursday, January 28, 2010, by the Supreme Court and the docket number is 09-8858.  My Writ of Mandamus is docketed at 09-8701 (in 5 working days the Supreme Court has docketed 157 cases.  This means probably another 100 that were returned for defects, lost or misplaced.  Imagine 250 cases per week times 52 weeks means 1000 cases a month are screaming to get into the Supreme Court.  This equals 12,000 cases a year.  When the Supreme Court only hears 100 issues a year the message sent to Appellate and District Court Judges is that they have unlimited discretion and they are the “inferior court.”  How can any court that is so inferior have so much power?  I intend to change that.

Granting me permission to appeal is a step in that direction.  I realize most of you are unaware that some of us are required to obtain permission to appeal lower court decisions inlcuding tax court.  Well, now you know!

The Tenth Circuit published the following on August 31, 2009:  “Mr. Springer is challenging the Tax Court’s determinations, claiming that he is not liable for the penalties and interest that the IRS has imposed in connection with the assessed income tax deficiencies because the IRS Form 1040 for each of the subject tax years did not comply with the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3549.

More specifically, Mr. Springer claims that § 3512 of the PRA provides him with a complete defense to at least part of his tax liabilities. Section 3512 is entitled “Public protection” and it provides as follows:

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information [from a federal agency] that is subject to this subchapter if–

(1) the collection of information does not display a valid control number assigned by the Director [of the Office of Management and Budget] in accordance with this subchapter; or

(2) the agency fails to inform the person who is to respond to the collection of information that such person is not required to respond to the collection of information unless it displays a valid control number.

(b) The protection provided by this section may be raised in the form of a complete defense, bar, or otherwise at any time during the agency administrative process or judicial action applicable thereto.

44 U.S.C. § 3512.

The words I have taken direct aim at are:  “Mr. Springer has not alleged any cognizable PRA violations with respect to those penalties. Instead, the only PRA violations he asserts concern the IRS Form 1040. The failure-to-pay penalties have an independent and separate statutory basis under the Internal Revenue Code, however, that is not based on Mr. Springer’s failure to file Form 1040s for the tax years in question.”

With respect to interest the Tenth Circuit published the following:  “Finally, with regard to the additional interest that was imposed in March 2005 under 26 U.S.C. § 6601(a) for each of the tax years in question, we agree with the Commissioner that the additional interest is not a “penalty” as that term is used in § 3512(a) of the PRA. See Aplee. Br. at 24 n.9. Although we have not found any case law addressing this issue, we conclude that the imposition of interest under the Internal Revenue Code does not fall within the PRA’s statutory definition of the term “penalty.” See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(14) (“the term ‘penalty’ includes the imposition by an agency or court of a fine or other punishment; a judgment for monetary damages or equitable relief; or the revocation, suspension, reduction, or denial of a license, privilege, right, grant, or benefit.”). This is consistent with the “clearly established principle that interest [imposed under the Internal Revenue Code] is not a penalty but is intended only to compensate the Government for delay in payment of a tax.”

With respect to the term “penalty” regarding failure to pay I have identified that Title 26, United States Code, Section 6151 places the payment of a tax to be due at the place where the requirement to file is to occur. I cited to the Supreme Court’s decision in Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47, 52 (1992) (“when a return of a tax is required . . . the person required to make such return shall . . . pay such tax”).

My defense is that a “Penalty under section 6651(a)(3) is clearly based upon Petitioner’s failure to file Form 1040s for the tax years in question. Failing to pay is based upon the purported requirement to pay and that purported duty begins with the requirement to file at Title 26, United States Code, Section 6091 with the “internal revenue district” and “district director” and ends with Section 6151’s obligation to pay “such tax at the time and place fixed for filing the return…(with such district director)”   [“At a bare minimum, in cases such as this one, in which the complex statutory and regulatory scheme lends itself to any number of interpretations, we should be inclined to rely on the traditional canon that construes revenue-raising laws against their drafter.” See Leavell v. Blades, 237 Mo. 695, 700-701, 141 S.W. 893, 894 (1911) (“When the tax gatherer puts his finger on the citizen, he must also put his finger on the law permitting it”); United States v. Merriam, 63 U.S. 179, 188 (1923) (“If the words are doubtful, the doubt must be resolved against the Government and in favor of the taxpayer”); Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage Co., 273 U.S. 346, 350 (1927) (“The provision is part of a taxing statute; and such laws are to be interpreted liberally in favor of the taxpayers”). Accord, American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U.S. 468, 474 (1891); Benziger v. United States, 192 U.S. 38, 55 (1904). “Tax laws, like all other laws, are made to be obeyed. They should therefore be intelligible to those who are expected to obey them.” Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Lederer, 21 F.2d 320, 321, 322.]

I continue “[T]his Court said nearly a century ago when the “word `file’ was not defined by Congress” involved in construing a criminal act, that “the etymology of the word must be considered and ordinary meaning applied.” United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 76 (1916) This Court went on to say that the “word `file’ is derived from the Latin word `filum,’ and relates to the ancient practice of placing papers on a thread or wire for safe keeping and ready reference.” Id. “Filing, it must be observed, is not complete until the document is delivered and received. `Shall file’ means to deliver to the office and not send through the United States mails. Gates v. State, 128 N.Y. Court of Appeals, 221.”   Id. “A paper is filed when it is delivered to the proper official and by him received and filed. Bouvier Law Dictionary; White v. Stark, 134 Cal. 178; Westcott v. Eccles, 3 Utah 258; In re Van Varcke, 94 F. 352; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Phiney, 76 F. 618.” Id, at 77 “Anything short of delivery would leave the filing a disputable fact, and that would not be consistent with the spirit of the act.”

“The Tenth Circuit, prior to the Panel decision being appealed herein, noted in United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 630 n.13 (10th Cir. 1990) that ‘because the provision of information in 1040 forms is inexorably linked to the statutory requirement to pay taxes, and defendant failed to file such forms, the Paperwork Reduction Act was applicable to such conduct.’”

The Supreme Court in Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, 494 U.S. 26, 33 (1990) determined the public protection applies to all government Forms and that “typical information collection requests include tax forms,…”

The suggestion by the Tenth Circuit that a “penalty” is not a “penalty” is looking the beast square in the eyes. I hope you all see that.

With regard to “interest” not being a penalty under the definition of penalty in the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, I argued that the fact no case has ever addressed this issue in our nations history is telling but alone not compelling.

I argue that “[I]nterest on a tax deficiency is separately mandated by 26 U.S.C. § 6601(a).” Commissioner v. McCoy,484 U.S. 3,71987) “A penalty that accrues under § 6651(a)(3) is also separate and outside the scope of the petition to the Tax Court.” Id. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (1819) (“[T]he power to tax involves the power to destroy”); quoted in Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 221 (1997)

I ask “[I]s interest on a tax deficiency a fine? Title 26, United States Code, Section 6665(a)(2) provides that “any reference in this title to `tax’ imposed by this title shall be deemed also to refer to the additions to tax, additional amounts, and penalties provided by this chapter.” Kollar v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 12 (fn.5)(T.C. 11-25-2008) See also Aranda v. Commissioner, 432 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 2005)(“interest and fraud penalties are treated as taxes”)”

Is interest an “other punishment”? Congress frequently refers to interest as an “addition” to tax and that for assessment purposes interest is treated as a tax. See Kollar and Agranda above.

Is interest a form of monetary damages? The Panel said it is to “compensate the Government for delay in payment of the tax.”

Clearly to compensate for delay is to compensate for damage.

The Tenth Circuit has previously found that “allowance of interest is essential to just compensation for damages. If the amount of unliquidated claims may be determined with reasonable accuracy, interest may be allowed.  P. (Bum) Gibbons v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 202 F.2d 469, 473 (10th Cir. 1953) To award “interest” is to compensate for damages.  See Brooklyn Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 715 (1945)(“..fact that interest is customarily allowed as compensation for delay in payment.”)

I conclude “[T]he amounts claimed owed are wholly based upon ‘returns prepared by the Secretary’ apparently through a purported delegate in 1996. Interest is also directly and inexorably linked to the filing of a return and the payment of any tax alleged to have been owed therein. Without a Form 1040 to have been determined required to have been filed, and that the amounts proposed on Rice’s Notice of Intent to Levy were classified as ‘additions’ to the Form 1040, there would be no way to apply or consider interest under Section 6601.”  Interest under Title 26, United States Code, Section 6601 is clearly and inexorably linked to the filing of a Form 1040 and the payment of taxes (even though the tax is a Bureau of Labor Statistics Tax).

To find otherwise is to actually turn protection from penalty under Title 26, United States Code, Section 6651(a)(1) to cause other penalties to be triggered [and owed] that would not have been triggered if it were not for the public protection provision. This creates an absurd result. Something Congress certainly could not have intended.

Lastly, the Panel found the Commissioner made a frivolous argument(s) about what the Tenth Circuit had held in previous appeals that I had filed. The Panel concluded that I raised difficult issues between the tax code and the PRA.

What I find amazing and shocking is that here we as people are presumed to “know the law” (remember ignorance of the law is no excuse) when that benefits the Government Attorneys and when the law we know of benefits, and is for the benefit of, the public, like the public protection provision, Sections 3502 and 3512 (this is not about taxes), the public first must argue with the Commissioner’s wannabes that the law even exists. Next we have to argue to Tax Court who threatens sanctions for administratively challenging penalties, including interest, with no explanation backing up the threat (no person ever addressed interest as penalty should shock you as it did me)(certainly not settled law now is it).

Next we have to get permission to appeal that decision to an Article III Court. Then we have to survive erroneous claims of frivolous and threats of sanctions by one of the 10,000 Government full time Attorneys (A person who goes to law school is clearly being courted to work for the Government) including filing restrictions even more than already exists. And final, we get to the place where the merits are to be addressed, and words that have normal every day established meaning, like penalty, are turned upside down by the Tenth Circuit because the only other option is to make a finding the Form 1040 does not comply with the Paperwork Reduction Act. We already have the finding that Form 1040 is required to comply.  Knock Knock!

I will admit when the term at issue is not defined by Congress, like “file” or “filum” that  “the etymology of the word must be considered and ordinary meaning applied.” United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 76 (1916) However, as the Tenth Circuit repeatedly has found “penalty” is defined by Congress.

Remember the power to destroy is the power to tax?

Ask yourself whether penalty or interest calculated from the date a payment is alleged to have been due is compensation for damages or seeking a “judgement for monetary damages”?

With this in mind, the questions I have presented are as follows:

1. What is the consequence to the “jurisdiction” of the Secretary of the Treasury and Commissioner of the Internal Revenue’s claims of statutory additions, penalty or interest, exercised outside the District of Columbia, when the office of district director and each internal revenue district established by law, pursuant to Title 26, United States Code, Section 7621, have been either eliminated completely, abolished in the year 2000, or never existed as a matter of law, in violation of Title 4, United States Code, Section 72?

2. Whether the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has delegation of authority, outside the District of Columbia, to issue or cause to be issued, a notice of levy in the absence of internal revenue districts, district director offices, and proper delegation, among the several States?

3. Whether Fred Rice is a delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury with redelegated authority from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act anywhere within the State of Oklahoma since at least the year 2000?

4. Does the definition of “penalty” pursuant to Title 44, United States Code, Section 3502(14)(1995) include amounts sought under Title 26, United States Code, Sections 6651(a)(1), 6651(a)(3), 6654(a) and 6601(a)?

A. All penalties labeled as such should be included within meaning of penalty at Title 44, United States Code, Section 3502 and 3512.

B. Interest under Title 26, United States Code, Section 6601 should be held as a penalty in compensating for damages under both Title 44, United States Code, Section 3502 “penalty” and 3512’s public protection.

5. Does Title 26, United States Code, Section 6330(c)(2)(B) withstand the “public protection” provided by Congress pursuant to Title 44, United States Code, Section 3512, involving the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue’s claims of additional penalties and interest pursuant to §§ 6651(a)(1), 6651(a)(3), 6654(a) and 6601(a) inexorably linked to the request for information Form 1040?

Many of you have supported me at one time or another and you can truly say that in regard to those issues in my defense you have been a blessing beyond measure. Any success I have is equally your success. To the extent I speak on behalf of any part of my country I salute you. You are the best. Your help remains needed. When and if you decide to continue your support of me I would appreciate either one of two methods. I can receive support at paypal through [email protected] or [email protected] I also can receive support at 5147 S. Harvard, # 116, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74135.

PS: For those of you wondering why I am not more charismatic in my solicitation of support is that I continue to believe you should support what you are led to support and not to support something because of the artful way it was presented to you.

It is what it is and I do the best I can with it.


No direct un-apportioned tax confirmed by the US Supreme Court rulings in

CHAS. C. STEWARD MACH. CO. v. DAVIS, 301 U.S. 548, 581-582(1937)

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This entry was posted on Saturday, March 27th, 2010 at 2:57 pm and is filed under IRS. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.

One comment

Tim Donnell

Great write-up. I came across your article and especially like the work you have done to cite cases supporting the taxpayer in the face of an incomprehensible tax code. May I offer the following:

1. Authority from the Secretary of the Treasury to tax its taxpayer is confined to D.C. Remember the taxpayer is never the man, but the entitity created when the man applied to the Social Security Administration for a contract. It is well-selttled that what the SSA created was a contract called a trust and the trust was offered it to the man to manage. When the man signed it, and continues to use the trust in commerce and daily life, the man takes on the representative role of that trust’s office. He virtually never acts in the man’s capacity, always the trustee capacity. The trust was slickly assigned a name (title) matching the applicant’s (the man’s) name and a SSN. The trust takes on many statutorily defined titles like “U.S. citizen (lower case “c”) ), “voter”, “person”, “individual”, “taxpayer”, and the trust always has a situs in D.C, everytime, all the time. In the states, the SSA-created trust is called a “driver”. In the banking world, the trust is called a “member”. In the county and cities, the trust is called a “resident” or “homeowner”. Each of these terms is statutorily defined. In law, the man is a Citizen.

Simply put, there are cases going on right now by people acting in their representative capacity as trustees that are putting the IRS on the stand asking them the simple question: “What is the tax liability for a SSA-created trust? , and, What is the form to file”.
The 1040 is simply not the correct form to file for trusts… and the Form 1041 is not either.
The IRS does not know what to do if they let “this cat out of the bag”.

The control is never about the man, but about what the man thinks. If the man thinks he owes taxes, he will pay them – for the trust he manages. To him, he is blind to the operating law around him – the law of trusts – to him, such things are nonsense.
To us, and other students in the law with like minded attitudes of knowing the law first, then obeying it, we have secured documentation with the SSA which they reluctantly agree: they created a trust .. Those secured documents are being used in court right now.

If you want to know more, please contact me or visit teamlaw.org. You will not be the same, I promise, after you see what I’ve seen.

Bottom line: Truth is in the law. The law is where the buck stops. Know the law, what it is and what is is not, they know you can prevail. Don’t know the law, take your chances.

Take care,
Tim Donnelly
Albany New York

August 23rd, 2010 at 7:00 am

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